Simultaneous price,location, and capacity decisions on a line of time‐sensitive customers

Consider a monopolist who sells a single product to time‐sensitive customers located on a line segment. Customers send their orders to the nearest distribution facility, where the firm processes (customizes) these orders on a first‐come, first‐served basis before delivering them. We examine how the monopolist would locate its facilities, set their capacities, and price the product offered to maximize profits. We explicitly model customers' waiting costs due to both shipping lead times and queueing congestion delays and allow each customer to self‐select whether she orders or not, based on her reservation price. We first analyze the single‐facility problem and derive a number of interesting insights regarding the optimal solution. We show, for instance, that the optimal capacity relates to the square root of the customer volume and that the optimal price relates additively to the capacity and transportation delay costs. We also compare our solutions to a similar problem without congestion effects. We then utilize our single‐facility results to treat the multi‐facility problem. We characterize the optimal policy for serving a fixed interval of customers from multiple facilities when customers are uniformly distributed on a line. We also show how as the length of the customer interval increases, the optimal policy relates to the single‐facility problem of maximizing expected profit per unit distance. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Saddam versus the inspectors: the impact of regime security on the verification of Iraq’s WMD disarmament

The discovery that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003 raised the question of why Saddam had prevented UN weapons inspectors from fully accounting for his disarmament. The leading explanation for Saddam’s behavior is that he valued ambiguity as part of a strategy of ‘deterrence by doubt’. This article argues that Iraq’s obstruction of inspectors in the late 1990s was motivated by his desire to shield Iraq’s regime security apparatus from UNSCOM’s intrusive counter-concealment inspections. The failure to understand how strongly Saddam’s concerns about his personal safety drove Iraq’s contentious relationship with UNSCOM set the stage for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.     

Alternatives for defense in the Post‐Soviet World: A guide for economists to the U.S. debate

The defense establishments of all major powers are changing to reflect changes in the foundations of national security strategy and resource allocation. The authors believe economists should play an active role in formulating these changes and offer an orientation to the U.S. debate, presenting three major alternatives: the “Base Force” (Bush Administration), Mr. Aspin's Force “C,” and the “Low” Alternative (Prof. Kaufmann and Dr. Steinbruner). These alternatives are compared using first‐order measures of capabilities, budgets and risk. Budgetary estimates are based on newly‐developed analytical tools.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

Reliability of linear multistate multiple sliding window systems

This paper proposes a new model that generalizes the linear consecutive k‐out‐of‐r‐from‐n:F system to multistate case with multiple failure criteria. In this model (named linear multistate multiple sliding window system) the system consists of n linearly ordered multistate elements (MEs). Each ME can have different states: from complete failure up to perfect functioning. A performance rate is associated with each state. Several functions are defined for a set of integer numbers ρ in such a way that for each r ∈ ρ corresponding function f_r produces negative values if the combination of performance rates of r consecutive MEs corresponds to the unacceptable state of the system. The system fails if at least one of functions f_r for any r consecutive MEs for r ∈ ρ produces a negative value. An algorithm for system reliability evaluation is suggested which is based on an extended universal moment generating function. Examples of system reliability evaluation are presented. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.